Date when decision was rendered: 24.6.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 1441; R2008/1139

Reference to source

KKO 2009:54.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2009 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2009 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2009 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2009

Pages: pp. 414-420

Subject

respect for private life, right to the inviolability of the home,
respekt för privatliv, rätt till hemmets okränkbarhet,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, kotirauhan suoja,

Relevant legal provisions

chapter 5a section 4-2 of the Coercive Measures Act; section 10 of the Constitution Act

= tvångsmedelslag 5a kapitel 4 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 10 §

= pakkokeinolaki 5a luku 4 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 10 §

Abstract

The court of first instance had granted the police authorisation for technical listening for one month at a time during the period of July-December 2005 for the investigation of a suspected aggravated tax fraud.The place subject to technical listening was a flat which was rented by a company and, according to the police, used by another company as an office.In their requests for authorisation for technical listening in July and August, the police had mentioned that an unknown person had since the end of May temporarily stayed overnight at the flat.Such overnighting was not mentioned in later requests.The Coercive Measures Act includes a specific list of offences in the investigation of which premises intended to be used as permanent residence can be subject to technical listening.Aggravated tax fraud is not included in this list.The central issue in this case was whether a flat used as an office could be subject to technical listening.

The Supreme Court held that in assessing whether premises are used as permanent residence, the decisive factor is not the purpose for which the premises were built or designated but the actual use of the premises at the time the request for authorisation for technical listening is made.In this case, the flat, when used as an office, was not used as permanent residence.However, according to the first request for authorisation submitted to the court of first instance, a listening device had been placed in premises which are normally used as permanent residence and where an unknown person had stayed overnight for over a month.The Supreme Court found that at that time, there had been an apparent danger that undisclosed listening by means of a technical device could infringe on that person's privacy and the inviolability of the home.Therefore, the Court continued, the court of first instance should have asked the police for further clarification regarding the using of the premises for overnight purposes and possible residence.Furthermore, the court of first instance had not given sufficient grounds for its decision but had only referred to the request by the police, appended to the court decision, and to the general assessment by the police of the temporary nature of residence.The Supreme Court concluded that because the actual use of the premises had not been properly examined when handling the request for authorisation, the preconditions for granting authorisation for technical listeming had not been fulfilled.

3.7.2009 / 15.2.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 15.12.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2562; S2009/88

Reference to source

KKO 2009:91.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2009 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2009 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2009 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 666-672

Subject

respect for private life, right to property, right to the inviolability of the home,
respekt för privatliv, äganderätt, rätt till hemmets okränkbarhet,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus, kotirauhan suoja,

Relevant legal provisions

chapter 18, section 2 and chapter 19, sections 12-1 and 13 of the Code of Inheritance; sections 10 and 15 of the Constitution Act

= ärvdabalken 18 kapitel 2 §, 19 kapitel 12 § 1 mom. och 19 kapitel 13 §; grundlagen 10 § och 15 §

= perintökaari 18 luku 2 §, 19 luku 12 § 1 mom. ja 19 luku 13 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 15 §.

ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

X had died and left a widow and four children.X had owned an estate in which his son Y had lived for over 45 years, first with his parents and later alone, after his father had died and his mother had moved into a sheltered home for the elderly.The widow and Y's three siblings asked the court of first instance to order that Y moves out and surrenders the estate to the joint administration of the widow and the heirs.The court of first instance decided the case in favour of the widow and the siblings.On Y's appeal, the court of appeal referred the case back to the court of first instance, in order for the lower court to consider the grounds for the eviction claim.The widow and an estate administrator, who had represented the decedent's estate before the court of appeal, appealed to the Supreme Court.

In its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the right to private life and the right to the inviolability of the home as guaranteed in section 10 of the Constitution Act and Article 8 of the ECHR.It also referred to the protection of property in section 15 of the Constitution Act and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.The Court noted that the inviolability of the home cannot be encroached unless such interference is in accordance with the law and necessary in order to protect the rights of other persons, such as the right to property.Moreover, in any decision-making pertaining to the inviolability of the home, the grounds for claims interfering with the inviolability of the home must be properly scrutinized.The Supreme Court noted that the estate administrator had not claimed that Y's living in the estate would prevent the settlement of the decedent's estate.The Court continued that in the court of first instance, it had been disputed whether Y had stopped the widow and the other heirs from using the estate or whether Y's actions were likely to cause damage to the property of the estate or its value.Because the court of first instance had regarded as inadmissible the evidence presented pertaining to these disputed issues, the Supreme Court referred the case back to the court of first instance for rehearing.

15.2.2010 / 14.4.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 9.3.2011

Judicial body: Kuopio Administrative Court = Kuopio förvaltningsdomstol = Kuopion hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 11/0113/7

Reference to source

Electronic database for administrative court decisions within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för beslut av förvaltningsdomstolar inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin hallinto-oikeuksien päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

right to the inviolability of the home, evidence, fair trial,
rätt till hemmets okränkbarhet, bevis, rättvis rättegång,
kotirauhan suoja, todisteet, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2-1, 7-1, 10, 35 and 37 of the Act on State Television and Radio Fund; sections 10 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om statens televisions- och radiofond 2 § 1 punkten, 7 § 1 mom., 10 §, 35 § och 37 §; grundlagen 10 § och 22 §

= laki valtion televisio- ja radiorahastosta 2 § 1 kohta, 7 § 1 mom., 10 §, 35 § ja 37 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 22 §

Abstract

The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) had ordered Z to pay a statutory inspection fee of EUR 100, because Z allegedly owned a television set but had not paid a television fee.In general, television license inspectors do not enter a household without the permission of the resident.In his appeal, Z claimed that the inspector, who had reported to have seen a television set in Z's living room, had entered the apartment through an open door while Z was away.Z presented as evidence photographs which showed that the living room was not visible from the front door of the apartment.On the basis of the photographs, the administrative court concluded that the inspector's observations could not be correct.FICORA had thus no grounds for the decision to order the inspection fee.With reference to the constitutional right to the inviolability of the home, the court continued that if the inspector had entered the apartment in Z's absence, he/she had used illegal means to obtain evidence.In that case, FICORA's decision on the inspection fee was based solely on evidence which had been obtained in violation of Z's fundamental right.Therefore, the decision was in clear contradiction with the constitutional duty of public authorities to guarantee the observation of human rights as well as the principle of fair trial, and the inspector's report could not form the grounds for ordering the payment of the inspection fee.The administrative court quashed FICORA's decision.

11.10.2012 / 11.10.2012 / RHANSKI